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Abstract
In this paper evidence on whether Hong Kong’s currency board arrangement, in place
since 1983, has affected the volatility of real macroeconomic variables is presented.
Simple evidence on the relative volatilities of relevant macroeconomic variables pre
and post 1983 is presented, before a more formal econometric framework is utilised to
examine the linkages between the exchange rate and the real economy. It is found that
the currency board period has been one of relative stability in Hong Kong, though it
has also been a period where external factors have been relatively benign. Even after
controlling for the external environment it is found that the currency board period is
one of low macroeconomic volatility.
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1.  Introduction
The Asian crisis has focused attention on the real costs that fixed exchange rates can
lead to when a country is forced to realign or float a misaligned exchange rate. The
simplest way to avoid such costly realignments is to have a flexible exchange rate,
and so it can be argued that flexible exchange rates should reduce real volatility in an
economy. Yet flexible exchange rates have costs of their own. Nominal and real
exchange rate volatility under flexible exchange rates are much larger than volatility
in fundamentals. Such volatility may translate into reduced trade and economic
growth. In this paper an attempt at assessing the impact of Hong Kong’s fixed
exchange rate on real volatility in Hong Kong is made.
Hong Kong has adopted a number of different exchange rate regimes in its history,
twice adopting currency board systems.
1 From 1935 to 1973, with the exception of the
years of Japanese occupation, Hong Kong operated a sterling exchange system – a
currency board with note issue back by holdings of Sterling assets. After briefly
pegging the Hong Kong dollar to the United States dollar in 1972, it was decided to
float the exchange rate on November 24 1974. After a period of political uncertainty
following the 1982 decision by China to resume sovereignty over the entirety of Hong
Kong (instead of just the New Territories), and a steep fall in the exchange rate
throughout 1983, the government announced on October 15 1983 that a currency
board would be reinstated. Since this time the exchange rate has remained fixed at the
rate of US$1 = HK$7.8.  Under the currency board arrangement note issuing banks
are required to pay US dollars to the Exchange Fund in exchange for Certificates of
Indebtedness, as cover for banknotes issued.
                                                
1 For a detailed description of Hong Kong’s experience under the currency boards see Jao (1998).2
The Hong Kong experience provides an interesting example for research on the
effects of exchange rate regime on a macroeconomy. Having survived the numerous
currency crises of the 1990s, Hong Kong’s experience with a fixed exchange rate is
long-lived by modern standards. While the currency board system is more likely to
remain in operation because of the more rule based monetary policy that is required
when compared with other fixed exchange rate systems, it is of interest to examine
whether these rules provide the macroeconomy with additional benefits or costs.
The paper will proceed as follows. In the following section the existing theoretical
and empirical evidence on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade and
macroeconomic performance will be briefly outlined. Section 3 presents evidence on
the volatilities of a number of macroeconomic variables relevant to Hong Kong’s
economic performance. Section 4 presents formal evidence trying to link together
these volatilities, and the final section offers some concluding comments.
2.  Existing Evidence on Exchange Rate Volatility and
Macroeconomic Performance.
Theoretical Evidence
There are two strands of macroeconomic theory that relate to the question of how
exchange rate volatility affects macroeconomic performance. The first strand
examines how the domestic economy responds to foreign and domestic real and
monetary shocks under different exchange rate regimes. The second strand focuses on3
the issue of how exchange rate volatility under flexible exchange rate regimes affects
international trade.
Macroeconomic theory suggests that the appropriate exchange rate regime depends on
the types of shocks that an economy typically faces, and on the extent to which capital
is internationally mobile. In the case of free mobility of capital, an economy that is
affected mainly by shocks to the LM curve, due to changes in money demand for
example, will experience large fluctuations in output, inflation, and the exchange rate
if the exchange rate is flexible. If the exchange rate is fixed and capital is
internationally mobile then the money supply is endogenous – changes in money
demand determine changes in the money supply so that LM shocks will have no effect
on output or inflation.
A foreign real shock will have larger affects on the domestic economy if the exchange
rate is fixed. If, for example, foreign income falls, the demand for domestic exports
will fall, leading to a fall in domestic income. Under flexible exchange rates this
effect will be mitigated by a depreciation of the exchange rate. A foreign financial
shock will have opposite effects under fixed and flexible exchange rates. A rise in
foreign interest rates will lead to a depreciation and a rise in income under flexible
exchange rates, but will lead to a monetary contraction and a fall income under fixed
exchange rates.
Overall, the impact of the exchange rate regime on volatility will depend on the type
of shocks hitting the domestic economy, with the general principle being that flexible
exchange rates provide better insulation against foreign sourced real shocks, and fixed4
exchange rates insulating against domestic sourced LM type shocks. In relation to this
final point, it is also true that fixed exchange rates are thought to deliver more credible
monetary policy and lower inflation. To the extent that lower inflation reduces
inflation variability then a fixed exchange rate regime will be preferable.
There is also a very large literature examining the question of how the exchange rate
regime affects international trade. The general argument is that exchange rates (both
real and nominal) will be more variable under flexible than under fixed exchange
rates, and this volatility will be harmful to trade.
2 Trade will be worse affected the
more risk averse are firms, the fewer are the opportunities to hedge against exchange
rate fluctuations, and the greater is the fraction of revenues and expenditures
denominated in foreign currency.
An interesting strand of this literature focuses on the impact of exchange rate
variability on firms’ location decisions. When deciding whether or not to invest in a
foreign country, the variability of the exchange rate will affect the option value of
delaying investment. Greater exchange rate variability will lead to ‘hysteresis’,
whereby firms are locked out of foreign countries by exchange rate variability, or
locked into countries in which firms are already located. It is hard to gauge the overall
effect of hysteresis on trade volumes, though it would appear that hysteresis would
reduce the level of capital flows between countries. In this paper some time series
evidence on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade in Hong Kong will be
presented.
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Empirical Evidence
Much of the research examining the relationship between exchange rate regimes and
real volatility has been a byproduct of empirical research on purchasing power parity.
A very large literature has arisen documenting the fact that flexible exchange rates
lead to medium to high frequency movements in real and nominal exchange rates that
are too great to be explained by macroeconomic fundamentals.
3 However, a number
of papers focus more directly on the implications of this volatility for the real
economy.
Baxter and Stockman (1989) investigate the time series behaviour of a number of
macroeconomic aggregates under alternative exchange rate systems during the post-
war period. They use a sample of 49 countries, and find little evidence of any
differences in the behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates or trade flows under
alternative exchange rate systems. Given that the flexible exchange rate periods
studied in their paper were periods of high exchange rate volatility, the conclusion
could be drawn that exchange rate volatility did not affect macroeconomic behaviour
in the large cross section of countries considered. Baxter and Stockman removed the
trends in the series under consideration by applying a linear trend, or by first
differencing. They then examine the properties of the detrended data, implicitly
focusing on the high and medium frequencies when the linearly detrended data is
examined, while focusing on the higher frequency properties of the (quarterly) data
when the differenced data are considered.
                                                
3 For a detailed survey of this literature see Froot and Rogoff (1995).6
Flood and Rose (1995) examine the bilateral $US exchange rate and macroeconomic
fundamentals in the G7 countries plus Holland and Sweden, over the period 1975 to
1990. They find that the monthly volatility of the nominal exchange rate cannot be
explained by any usual set of macroeconomic fundamentals.  They first compute the
sample standard deviations of each of the variables for non-overlapping two year
subsamples of the data, which generates eight sample periods for each of the nine
countries. Volatilities of the macroeconomic variables can then be compared with the
volatility of the real exchange rate. The only robust correlation among the bivariate
comparisons of the volatilities appears to be a negative correlation between real
output volatility and exchange rate volatility.  The paper also considers some well
known structural models to try to explain the exchange rate volatility, but is unable to
find any convincing explanation for the rise in volatility that occurs when exchange
rates are flexible. They tentatively conclude that there is “little empirical evidence that
reducing exchange rate volatility compromises the stability of other macroeconomic
variables.”
Rose (1996) examines a larger data set of twenty industrialised countries and
considers the question of whether fixed exchange rates “bottle up” volatility, which is
released when the exchange rate is floated or devalued. The volatility of
macroeconomic variables three years prior to and three years after floats and
devaluations is examined for evidence of changes in volatility. It is found that exports
and the current account become more variable after such episodes, though other
macroeconomic aggregates do not. Once again the conclusion is that there is little
evidence of significant increases in volatility due to changes in the exchange rate
regime.7
Three papers that take a time series perspective on the question of exchange rate
volatilities and macroeconomic behaviour are Hutchison and Walsh (1992), Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1994) and Kwan and Lui (1999). Hutchison and Walsh look at the
performance of the Japanese economy before and after the move to flexible exchange
rates in the mid-1970s. They find that output was much more stable after the move to
flexible exchange rates, but they attribute this to both a more industrialised economy
in Japan, and also to a more benign internal economic environment after the mid-
1970s. Hutchison and Walsh use structural VARs to decompose output into shocks
attributable to foreign disturbances (US GNP and money supply variables), to oil
price shocks, and to domestic disturbances (Japanese GNP shocks). They find that
there was a change in both the magnitude and the nature of shocks hitting the
Japanese economy after 1973. After 1973 real oil shocks were larger, but domestic
sourced shocks were much smaller. Impulse responses are consistent with the flexible
exchange rate regime insulating the domestic economy from foreign shocks – impulse
responses for oil price shocks suggest a much smaller output response during the
flexible rate period. Overall, they conclude that the transition to a more mature
economy reduced the size of domestic sourced shocks in Japan, and that the economy
was more stable after the move to flexible exchange rates despite larger oil and US
monetary shocks after 1973. In addition they conclude that their impulse responses
suggest that flexible exchange rates in Japan are more effective in insulating Japanese
real output from foreign shocks.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) use a bivariate SVAR in prices and output to
examine the aggregate demand and supply equations for the G7 countries. They use
the assumption that demand shocks do not have permanent effects to identify their8
model (along the lines of Blanchard and Quah (1989)), and estimate the model over
the pre and post Bretton Woods eras. Using the impulse response patterns from the
estimated model, they argue that the aggregate demand curve has become steeper for
the G7 countries over the floating rate period, a result they attribute to the difference
in monetary policy practices under floating rates. The implication of a steeper
aggregate demand curve is that supply shocks have a smaller impact on output (or
output growth).
Kwan and Lui (1999) estimate the model used by Bayoumi and Eichengreen on the
Hong Kong data, and reach the opposite conclusion to Hutchison and Walsh – they
find that the currency board in Hong Kong reduced output and inflation volatility after
1983. Both output and inflation volatility fell after 1983, and Kwan and Lui attribute
two-thirds of the fall in volatility to the introduction of the currency board. The
variables in their model are Hong Kong GDP and prices. The choice of only two
variables in their model may be problematic in that their structure would not
adequately capture changes in Hong Kong’s external environment such as those
changes found for Japan by Hutchison and Walsh. In other words, their results could
be driven by a change in the size of foreign shocks after 1983, not captured by the
model, rather than by a change in the exchange rate regime. It is of interest that the
papers considered above reach three different conclusions regarding the effect of the
exchange rate regime on the macroeconomic environment. In the first case the
exchange rate regime did not affect macroeconomic outcomes, in two cases flexible
exchange rates reduced volatility, while in the final case flexible exchange rates
increased volatility. It would seem that there is thus considerable scope for more
research in this area.9
There is also a very large literature that examines the impact of exchange rate
volatility on trade. The predominant finding in the literature is that exchange rate
volatility either has no effect, or has a very small effect, on trade. Gagnon (1993)
seeks to explain this result using a calibrated model designed to exaggerate the effects
of exchange rate variability on trade. He finds that exchange rate volatility of the
magnitudes observed until the early 1990s would not significantly affect trade.
Two recent papers that do find significant effects of exchange rate volatility on trade
are Rose (1999) and Arize, Osango and Slottje (2000). Rose finds a very large
positive effect of a currency union on international trade, and a small negative effect
of exchange rate volatility on trade. Rose uses a large panel data set to estimate an
augmented gravity model of trade. Standard gravity models include only income and
distance variables to explain trade between two countries – the model Rose estimates
is augmented with a number of other variables including common language, common
currency, and exchange rate volatility.
Arize, Osango and Slottje (2000) estimate an export demand equation for thirteen
LDCs with world demand conditions, the terms of trade, and the moving sample
standard deviation of the exchange rate as explanatory variables. In all countries the
impact of exchange rate volatility on trade is found to be negative and significant.
Overall the empirical literature does not seem to come to any firm conclusion about
the implications of greater exchange rate volatility on trade. However, there do appear
to be some important gaps in our understanding of the possible effects of exchange
rate volatility. Firstly, there is very little time series evidence on exchange rate10
volatility and macroeconomic volatility. Secondly, it is of interest to consider the
behaviour of the Hong Kong economy during the currency board period, as this type
of fixed exchange rate regime remains relatively uncommon. A number of countries
have recently implemented a currency board, and so a more detailed understanding of
the Hong Kong experience will better enable a judgement on the costs and benefits of
such an arrangement. In the next section of the paper the univariate properties of the
data are outlined.
3.  Volatility in Hong Kong
In this section of the paper the time series properties of a number of macroeconomic
series relevant to Hong Kong’s economic performance will be summarised.  The
variables that are examined are Hong Kong GDP, government expenditure, exports,
imports (all real), the CPI, the (CPI based) real exchange rate, the US Federal Funds
rate, the real (Hong Kong dollar) price of oil, and Singaporean real GDP.
4 In this
section of the paper the univariate properties of the data are documented, while in the
next section we attempt to relate the variables to try and determine any effects that
real exchange rate volatility has on GDP and trade. Factors that might affect GDP and
trade include fiscal policy (government expenditure), exchange rates, and variables
reflecting foreign monetary and real forces (the Funds Rate and oil prices).
Singaporean GDP data is presented because of the frequent comparisons made
between the two countries. The fact that Singapore had a flexible exchange rate over
                                                
4 The real exchange rate was constructed using the trade weights of Hong Kong’s six largest trading
partners excluding China (the US, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Germany and the UK). The trade weights
used were those used by the IMF to construct a real exchange rate series for Hong Kong. (For details
on the construction of the weights see Zanello and Desruelle (1997)). China was not included because a
quarterly CPI series was unavailable over the sample period used. A large fraction of Hong Kong’s11
the sample period makes this comparison of interest to this paper. All data is
quarterly, seasonally adjusted, from 1974:3 to 1999:4.
Figure 1 presents the graphs of the growth rates of each of the variables.
5 The graph of
Hong Kong GDP growth shows quite clearly a fall in volatility at the end of the
sample. However, the fall in volatility appears to begin around 1989, six years after
the introduction of the currency board. Government expenditure, export, and import
growth shows no obvious pattern in volatility, though exports and imports do appear
to be quite volatile prior to 1976. Changes in inflation show much less volatility since
around the time of the introduction of the currency board in 1983. Changes in the real
Hong Kong dollar price of oil are on average large and contain some spikes, though
there is no obvious volatility pattern. Movements in the Federal Funds rate have,
however, showed considerably less volatility since 1983 than previously. It is
interesting that this decline in volatility corresponds quite closely with the
introduction of the currency board. Real exchange rate changes and Singaporean GDP
growth show no obvious patterns in volatility, though it appears that real exchange
rate volatility may be lower in the 1990s than prior to this.
The upper half of Table 1 provides some more formal evidence on the volatilities of
each of the variables prior to and since 1983. The quarterly growth rates for each of
the series is presented, along with the standard deviation and correlation with GDP
over the fixed and the floating rate period (the fourth quarter of 1983 was omitted as
                                                                                                                                           
trade with China is re-exports, which are not as closely related to the real exchange rate as other forms
of trade, and so this omission is not seen to be too important.
5 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots (including a constant or a constant and a trend and up to
four lags) suggest that all of the variables are I(1), with the exception of the CPI, which appears to be
I(2).  Hence all of the growth rates reported, with the exception of the inflation rate, will be stationary
over the sample. Results of the unit root tests are available from the author on request.12
the exchange rate was fixed during this quarter). Output growth is lower over the
latter sub-sample, though not significantly so. Output growth is also lower in
Singapore, perhaps reflecting both countries ‘catch-up’ with high income
industrialised countries. The only variables with significantly different means over the
sub-samples are government expenditure growth and the price level (inflation) with
lower growth, and the real exchange rate with significantly higher growth.
6 While it
might be argued that the lower output growth could be related to the real exchange
rate appreciation over the fixed exchange rate period, the IMF (1999) suggest that the
appreciation is consistent with productivity growth and terms of trade movements
over this period. It is noted that Singapore also experienced a large real appreciation
over this seventeen year period.
The variances of the differenced data tell a very systematic story. With the exception
of the change in oil prices and Singaporean GDP growth, all of the variances are
lower.
7 Only in the case of inflation and the real exchange rate is this reduction in
volatility insignificant. It is interesting to note that the fixing of the exchange rate did
not result in a significant fall in real exchange rate volatility. If Hong Kong had the
same real exchange rate weights as the US then fixing the exchange rate to the US
dollar will simply buy Hong Kong the real exchange rate volatility of the US. The
extent to which the currency board regime will reduce real exchange rate volatility
will depend on the importance of the US in Hong Kong’s trading relationships. Two
                                                
6 Tests for the equality of means, variances and correlations rely on independent samples. Serial
correlation may therefore be problematic to these tests. Autocorrelations are significant in the flexible
rate period only for Singaporean GDP (first order) and inflation and its change (up to fourth order). In
the fixed rate period there is evidence of first order serial correlation in GDP growth, second order
serial correlation in export and import growth, and fourth order serial correlation in inflation.
7 It is noted that the oil price data begins in 1974:3, just after the large OPEC related increase in prices.
Adding two earlier data points would raise the variance of oil price inflation in the earlier period above
that in the second period. (This would be true for any reasonable assumption about inflation in 1973/4.
Actual quarterly CPI data does not exist before 1974:3).13
important facts relevant to the reduction in output volatility are the reduced variability
in government expenditure growth and in the Federal Funds rate.
Correlations with GDP also show some changes over the two sub-samples.
Government expenditure growth is acyclical, though the change in the correlation is
significantly different from zero. Imports are acyclical in the flexible exchange rate
period, but procyclical in the fixed rate period. Inflation is also acyclical, though the
change from negative to positive correlation with GDP is significant. The Federal
Funds rate switches from being countercyclical before 1984 to having a small positive
correlation in the second sub-period. There are a number of stories consistent with this
change, but an interesting possibility is that the Hong Kong economy (or at least Hong
Kong monetary policy) has become more synchronised with that of the United States.
If Hong Kong GDP growth were highly correlated with US GDP growth we might
expect to see US tightenings during periods of high growth (and hence a positive
correlation). The change to a positive correlation could be due to synchronisation of
policy synchronising business cycles in the two countries, or due to synchronisation of
the two countries’ business cycles leading to synchronisation of policies. With a fixed
exchange rate the first argument is likely to be correct, while the second argument
may or may not be true. Finally, the change in the real exchange rate is acyclical.
It is possible that many of the ‘facts’ described in the upper half of Table 1 are related
to the high frequency movements in the series, which may in some cases include a
considerable amount of noise. In particular, we might think of high frequency
movements in exchange rates, such as quarterly or monthly growth rates, as being
dominated by short term fluctuations that are reversed over longer periods of time14
when fundamentals come to the fore. If this is the case then the focus on high
frequency volatilities and correlations might give a misleading impression of the
business cycle characteristics of the variables.   The volatilities and correlations
reported in the lower half of Table 1 refer to data that have had the high frequency
components and the trends filtered from the data. A band pass filter, described in
Baxter and King (1995), is used to remove the trends and the high frequency
variability in the series
8. After filtering, the movements in each series that persist for
more than eighteen months and less than eight years remain (commonly described as
being the business cycle components of the series). Since we are interested in the
effects of exchange rates on the real economy it would seem that these might be
important frequencies on which to focus attention. The empirical literature on
exchange rate behaviour (see Froot and Rogoff (1995) for example) is consistent with
departures from PPP having a half-life of three to five years. In other words shocks to
the real exchange rate on average take about six to ten years to be seventy-five percent
dissipated. Any long run trends in real exchange rates, if they exist, will therefore
reflect differences in productivity across countries rather than short run shocks to the
real exchange rate. Hence filtered movements in the real exchange rate will reflect
persistent movements in the real exchange rate not associated with trends that are
related to the structure of the economy, but which may have important effects on the
real economy.
Figures 11 to 18 show the filtered data for GDP (the solid line), along with each of the
other series under consideration. A number of features of the data are clear from the
                                                
8 Baxter and King (1995) compare this filter to the Hodrick-Prescott filter and some other detrending
methods in some detail. The band pass filter renders any I(1) or I(2) series stationary. The filter leaves
components in a series that are similar to those obtained using the HP filter, though an important
advantage over the HP filter is the fact that no phase shifts in the filtered series are induced.15
graphs. Both imports and exports are strongly procyclical. The real exchange rate and
GDP do not appear to be closely related, oil price swings are large, and the business
cycle in Hong Kong is not closely related to the Singaporean business cycle (except
that both countries seem to be in recession together).
The lower half of Table 1 presents the standard deviations and correlations with GDP
for the filtered data. During the currency board period the cyclical volatility of GDP
was around 8 percent lower than during the earlier period, though this fall in volatility
is not statistically significant. As in the differenced data there is a clear pattern of falls
in volatility, with only Singaporean GDP exhibiting greater volatility in the second
sub-period (though volatility is lower than in Hong Kong). The falls in the volatility
of government expenditure, the real exchange rate, and the Federal Funds rate are all
statistically significant. It is interesting that significant falls in volatility of these three
factors did not significantly reduce output volatility. Finally, in contrast to the results
with the differenced data, oil price volatility is (insignificantly) lower in the filtered
data.
The filtered data show some quite different cyclical patterns to the differenced data,
though in general correlations with GDP rise in the currency board period whichever
filter is used. The size of the government expenditure correlation with GDP is similar
to the differenced data in both subsamples, again consistent this variable being
acyclical. Both exports and imports again become more procyclical, exports
significantly so, in the currency board period. In the filtered data fluctuations in prices
change significantly from being mildly procyclical to being acyclical, in contrast to
the differenced price (inflation) data. The filtered real exchange rate correlation16
changes markedly, from significantly different from zero and procyclical, to being
mildly countercyclical. Here the correlation is consistent with economic theory.
Theory suggests that the real exchange rate should be procyclical. Tighter monetary
policy during the expansionary phase of the business cycle should see inflation fall,
and also put upward pressure on the exchange rate. Empirically this effect is often
difficult to pick up, as what really is important is the state of the business cycle in the
domestic economy relative to the state of the business cycle in foreign countries. The
filtered data does, however, provide evidence of this effect in Hong Kong during the
flexible exchange rate period. After the currency board period the real exchange rate
does not follow this pattern. This is consistent with monetary policy being determined
by economic conditions in the US, rather than in Hong Kong. The filtered Fund rate
data shows a significant fall in the correlation with GDP, in contrast with the
correlation in growth rates.
Overall Table 1 provides robust evidence regarding the pattern of volatilities during
the flexible exchange rate and during the currency board periods, though the evidence
regarding cyclical patterns is less consistent across filtering methods. Volatility is
generally lower during the currency board era for all of the variables that might affect
Hong Kong’s output and trade volatility. Foreign monetary shocks, measured by the
volatility of the Federal Funds rate, are significantly smaller in the currency board
period. Domestic fiscal volatility is also significantly lower during the currency board
era. The evidence on oil price volatility is mixed, though it is clear that including the
1974 oil price shock in the sample would lead to the conclusion that this volatility was
also lower in the currency board period. Alternately, making the reasonable
assumption that the impact on output volatility of oil price shocks lasts at least two17
quarters, the influence of oil price volatility on output volatility is lower in the
currency board period. It would be desirable to have a measure of domestic monetary
policy over the sample period, but the author has been unable to locate a quarterly
monetary aggregate or interest rate variable that would be appropriate over the sample
period. While changes in the Fund rate are likely to feed through very strongly to
domestic rates and so be a good proxy for domestic monetary policy in the currency
board era, no data is presented on monetary policy variability in the floating exchange
rate period. The relevant issue is to what extent was monetary policy variability
responsible for the level of output volatility prior to 1983. Jao (1998) argues that
monetary policy was very volatile from 1975 to 1983 (annual monetary growth was
very high), and that this exacerbated business cycle fluctuations. However, it is
difficult to assess the extent to which this volatility differed from monetary and
interest rate volatility post 1983 without access to quarterly data.
All of the results so far are based on the univariate properties of the series, most
importantly the unconditional variances and means of each of the series. Of course the
real issue is the extent to which these variances and means are related, and we now
turn to the multivariate evidence on these relationships.
4.  Empirical Results
There are several different methods available to try and link together the variables and
volatilities presented in the previous section. In order to model output volatility a
three variable VAR will be estimated, and several pieces of evidence presented.
Firstly, the stability of the VAR will be tested. If the VAR is stable, then it would18
appear that there is no evidence that the structure of the Hong Kong economy has
changed after the introduction of  the currency board. Secondly, the size of the shocks
in the output equation will be compared over the two sub-samples, to see if there is
evidence of reduced volatility after conditioning on shocks to other variables in the
model. Finally, the level and volatility of trade will be related to exchange rate
volatility since 1974.
In estimating a VAR there is a choice between a large model which captures all of the
possible forces affecting variables of interest, and a more parsimonious model which
uses less degrees of freedom and enables more efficient estimation. Given the aim of
estimating the impact of the exchange rate regime on output volatility it is common to
choose a small, three or four variable model. Given the available data it is felt that a
three variable model including the real oil price, the federal funds rate, and output
growth will best describe the output process. The oil price shock should pick up the
effect of exogenous real shocks on the Hong Kong economy, while the federal funds
rate will pick up the impact of foreign monetary shocks on Hong Kong. During the
currency board era the funds rate should also describe the impact of domestic
monetary policy on output, because of the link between domestic and foreign
monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate. Finally, the output variable will pick up
all of the other shocks which affect Hong Kong’s GDP. These presumably include
monetary, fiscal and any other forces that affect GDP.
The structural model is of the form;
, ) ( 1 t t t X L B AX ε + = −                                          (1)19
where Xt is a vector containing ot, the change in the real oil price, ft, the change in the
federal funds rate, and yt, the change in Hong Kong GDP, A is a 3x3 matrix, B(L) is a




f  and ε t
y. Premultiplying both sides of (1) by A yields the reduced form
equation
, ) ( 1 t t t e X L X + Γ = −                                            (2)
where Γ (L) = A
-1B(L), and et = A
-1ε t. We can think of the structural shock to y as
containing all of the factors that affect Hong Kong GDP other than the (foreign)
forces picked up by the two other shock variables. In order to recover the residuals in
(1) from the estimated equation (2) some identifying assumptions must be made.
Typical identifying assumptions include long run restrictions, restrictions on the
matrix A, or combinations of these two sets of restrictions. In this paper it seems
natural to treat the foreign variables in the model as an exogenous block, and to treat
oil as being contemporaneously unaffected by other variables in the model.
9 These
assumptions enable us to identify the structural residuals from the reduced form
residuals given the variable ordering o, f, y in (2).
The preferred model has four lags, and is estimated including a constant. Each
variable is entered in first difference form as in (1) and (2), consistent with the unit
root evidence outlined in footnote 6.
10 The first test that is conducted is a stability test
for the output equation in the model. A Chow test for a structural break in 1983:4
rejects the null of parameter constancy at any reasonable significance level. The F-test
statistic is 14.61, which has a p-value of less than .01. If we treat the break date as
                                                
9 A more restricted model where the price of oil is treated as an exogenous variable in both of the other
equations of the model (restricting the coefficients on all of the variables except lagged oil prices to be
zero in the oil equation) leads to very similar results to those presented in this section of the paper.20
endogenous, rather than fixed at 1983:4, and search for structural breaks from 1980:1
to 1990:1 the F-max statistic is 18.55 in 1982:1. Simulating the model to calculate
correct critical values once again leads to rejection of the null of parameter constancy.
Hence we can conclude that there is strong evidence of instability in the model, with a
structural break occurring around the time of the introduction of the currency board in
1983. We continue under the assumption that two models are required to represent the
data, one estimated prior to, and one after 1983.
Table 2 presents the results of causality tests for each equation of the model. In the
pre-1984 sample lags of each variable only enter significantly in the own equation of
the model. In the output equation the only coefficient that is significant at the five
percent level is on the first lag of output. In the latter subsample there are more
significant coefficients, and lags of the federal funds rate are helpful in forecasting
output. Tests for skewness or excess kurtosis of the residuals in the output equation do
not provide evidence against the null in either case, consistent with the residuals being
normally distributed. Figure 19 plots the residuals from the output equations estimated
over the two subsamples. The figure provides similar evidence to the univariate
results presented in the previous section. Shocks to output are significantly smaller
since 1983, though much of this reduction in volatility appears to be due to output
being very predictable from around 1989 to 1995.
The correlations between the reduced form residuals are less than 0.2 in absolute
value in each case in the latter subsample, and less than 0.5 in absoulute value in the
earlier subsample,  so it seems unlikely that changes in ordering of the variables or in
                                                                                                                                           
10 Tests for cointegration do not show any evidence of cointegration among the variables.21
identification strategy will affect the conclusions above. Hutchison and Walsh (1992)
and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) identified the impact of the exchange rate
regime on the domestic economy by examining the shape of the impulse response
functions. Figures 20 and 21 show the response of output to unit shocks to the oil
price and to the funds rate over each subsample. Figure 20 shows the response of
output to a unit shock to the price of oil. The impulse responses are very different, but
also contrary to economic theory. In the first sub-sample increases in the price of oil
lead to a rise in output growth which persists for at least twenty quarters (refer to
impy1), while in the currency board period output initially falls, but rises after ten
periods (impy2). While these responses are perverse, simulated two standard error
bands (not shown) include zero in both cases. It is also the case that we can drop the
oil price variable from the model with no affect on the fit of the output equations. It
seems that the oil price variable is simply not doing a very good job at picking up the
impact of foreign real shocks on the Hong Kong economy. Shocks to the funds rate do
have the effect on output predicted by economic theory. Once again there is a
difference between the responses in the currency board period and previously. Prior to
1984 changes in the federal funds rate had no impact on the Hong Kong economy
(refer to impy1), while since 1984 US monetary tightenings have had a significant
effect on Hong Kong’s GDP growth two to three years after such tightenings (again
according to the simulated confidence intervals). This is consistent with the idea that
flexible exchange rates do allow an economy to insulate against foreign monetary
shocks.
In order to examine the impact of exchange rate volatility on the trade variables some
simple graphical techniques along the lines of Flood and Rose (1995) are presented.22
Figures 22 and 23 show the variance of the exchange rate in each non-overlapping
two year interval from 1974 to 1999, along with the mean growth in real exports or
imports for the subsequent two year period (graphs of contemporaneous growth look
similar). The graphs show no obvious pattern, and the correlations between exchange
rate volatility and the trade variables are not significantly different from zero. Though
this technique is admittedly simple, it leads us to the conclusion that the periods of
greater real exchange rate volatility in Hong Kong are not followed by periods of any
lower or higher growth in trade. If we replace the mean growth rate of the trade
variables with the variance of these growth rates the same conclusion is reached.
5.  Conclusions
In this paper the evidence on whether Hong Kong’s currency board arrangement
affects real macroeconomic volatility has been examined. Overall there is evidence
that the currency board period has been one of relatively low volatility in Hong Kong.
The low volatility has coincided with a benign external environment, though after
controlling for the level of external volatility it is still concluded that volatility is
lower than expected since 1983. Can we conclude that the reduction in volatility has
been caused by the change in the exchange rate regime in 1983? There seem to be two
issues that need further exploration before this conclusion could confidently be made.
Firstly, to what extent has the currency board arrangement reduced real exchange rate
volatility? The estimates in this paper suggest that the CPI based real exchange rate
has seen a fall in volatility of the order of eight percent. It would be desirable to
measure volatility using other methods and exchange rate data than have been used in
this paper to check the robustness of this conclusion. Secondly, why did the reduction23
in volatility appear to occur several years after the introduction of the currency board?
Growth was very stable in Hong Kong from around 1989 until the Asian crisis, and
perhaps some factor not explored in this paper can account for this stability. I have
explored, with no success, two alternative explanations for this stability. One
possibility, consistent with the idea that Hong Kong’s industrialisation process has
delivered more stable output, is that the change from a manufacturing to a more
services based economy leads naturally to greater stability. To test this hypothesis I
examined the annual variability in manufacturing and in financing, insurance, real
estate and business services, since 1980. While it is true that the importance of
manufacturing has steadily declined over this period from around 22% to around 6%
of GDP, the variance of the growth in manufacturing is actually less than the variance
in services growth. Hence it would not appear that the move away from a
manufacturing based economy is the cause of the stability of output. Relatedly, the
share of government in GDP has not changed, so the stability in the 1990s cannot be
attributed to a rising share of a less volatile government sector in the economy. A
second possibility is that the stability in Hong Kong is related to more stable
economic growth in China. Because of the importance of re-exports to the Hong Kong
economy, growth in China is very important to Hong Kong’s economic performance.
Perhaps stable growth in China is responsible for stability in Hong Kong? Again it
would seem not. The annual real GDP data for China that is available since 1980 does
not suggest any reduced volatility in the 1990s.
Is it possible to argue the case more strongly for or against a currency board in Hong
Kong on the basis of the evidence in this paper? The answer to this question will
depend on a more full blown account of the impact of the exchange rate regime on the24
growth rates of the variables studied, as well as considering just the volatilities. The
evidence in this paper does, however, provide support for the idea that a currency
board is able to reduce volatility in the real economy, as well as in the real exchange
rate.25
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Table 1: Volatilities and Correlations.
Differenced Data
1974:4-1983:3 1984:1-1999:4
Variable x σσσσρ ρρρ x σσσσρ ρρρ
∆ GDP 7.6 2.61 1.00       5.0 1.59
* 1.00




∆ Exports 9.1 4.75 0.59     10.5 3.04
* 0.64
∆ Imports 12.5 5.83 -0.09     10.8 3.51
* 0.42
*
Inflation 8.3 1.27 -0.23      6.0
* 1.04 0.10
*
∆ Inflation 0.1 1.08 -0.32    -0.3 0.55
* 0.01
∆ Real exch. -2.9 3.21 0.00     2.8
* 2.92 -0.02
∆ Funds Rate -0.3 2.51 -0.31    -0.3 0.68
* 0.21
*
∆ Oil 14.1 14.22 0.09    -2.9 21.38
* 0.08
∆ Sing. GDP 8.1 0.95 -0.18      6.9 1.87 0.19
*
Band Pass Filtered Data
GDP  3.23 1.00  2.98 1.00
Govt. Exp.  2.89 0.04   1.56
∗ 0.24
Exports  5.69 0.74  4.90 0.89
∗
Imports  6.70 0.75  5.30 0.84
CPI  2.40 0.24  1.99 -0.07
∗
Real exch.  4.73 0.36   3.61
∗ -0.15
∗
Funds Rate  2.07 0.50   0.99
∗ 0.08
∗
Oil 18.58 0.17 17.53 0.23
Sing. GDP  1.29 0.59   2.75
∗ 0.43
Notes to Table:  x is the mean annualised growth rate for each variable, σ  is the
standard deviation of the differenced or filtered series, and ρ  is the correlation with
GDP. A 
∗  indicates that the mean, standard deviation or the correlation is significantly
different from the standard deviation or correlation in the earlier subsample, at the
five percent significance level (the null hypothesis relies on the assumption of
independent samples).28
Table 2: VAR estimates
Model:  t t t X L B X L A ε + = − 1 ) ( ) (
Equation OIL FUNDS RATE HK GDP
F-stat. p-value F-stat. p-value F-stat. p-value
F-test oil→ 7.45 0.00 0.30 0.87 0.81 0.53
1974-83 funds→ 0.41 0.80 5.64 0.00 1.03 0.41
hkgdp→ 0.89 0.49 1.41 0.26 88.88 0.00
F-test oil→ 7.50 0.00 0.71 0.59 0.41 0.81
1984-99 funds→ 1.48 0.22 59.62 0.00 4.46 0.00
hkgdp→ 1.70 0.16 0.89 0.48 1511.50 0.00
Test for skewness (null = no skewness) 1974:3-1983:4 0.63
Test for kurtosis (null = no kurtosis) 0.50
Test for skewness (null = no skewness) 1983:4-1999:4 0.60
Test for kurtosis (null = no kurtosis) 0.95
Notes to Table: The cell values represent the results from F-tests of the hypothesis
that the coefficients on the lagged row variables are zero in the column equation. The
standard error of the estimate in the output equation was .0225 from 1974:3-1983:4
and .0131 in the 1983:4-1999:4 subsample.29
Figure 1: Hong Kong GDP growth









Figure 3: Export growth



















Figure 7: Change in real $HK Oil price









Figure 9: Real Exchange Rate change











Figure 2: Government Expenditure growth









Figure 4: Import growth










Figure 6: Change in Inflation








Figure 8: Change in Federal Funds Rate








Figure 10: Singaporean GDP growth







Figure 11: GDP and Government Consumption












Figure 12: GDP and Exports










Figure 13: GDP and Imports











Figure 14: GDP and Prices










Figure 15: GDP and the real Exchange Rate












Figure 16: GDP and the US Federal Funds Rate










Figure 17: GDP and real oil prices








Figure 18: Hong Kong GDP and Singaporean GDP












Figure 19: Residuals from two sub-sample output equations






Figure 20: Impulse Response, Oil shocks to output









Figure 21: Impulse Response, Funds shocks to output
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